One of the most common questions in today’s cognitive studies is the one regarding embodied cognition. The answer to this question draws our attention to many factors, including bodily actions, which also work to embody cognition. With this in mind, enactivism is included in discussions of embodiment. Some authors are comparing cognition to a handshake and dancing. Enactivism equates cognition with action, focusing on its very performance.
The present issue consists mainly of ten articles that are ten standpoints on enactivism: not only from the point of view of the critics (K. Aizawa, P. Steiner, F. Cummins, K. Bielecka) and the proponents (S. Gallagher & M. Brower, R. Ellis, Q. Li & I. Winchester), but also spokespeople for the moderate approach (D. Reid, R. Briscoe, J.L. Petit). The abovementioned papers are significantly complemented by two interviews: one with S. Gallagher, and the other with R. Rupert, as well as by two book reviews by P. Grosse and Ch. Drain; they are able to direct the attention towards more broadly conceived issues connected with situating cognitive processes.